Concept 1 of 71 min
Computing VaR: parametric, historical and combined
A parametric VaR, in millions
| Portfolio | 250 |
|---|---|
| Daily volatility | 0.8% |
| Multiplier at 99% | 2.33 |
- VaR = 2.33 × 0.008 × 250 = 4.66
A 1-day 99% VaR of 4.66 million: the loss stays below it 99 days out of 100, and can be far larger on the 100th.
From 1 day to 25
| 1-day VaR | 2,000,000 |
|---|---|
| Horizon | 25 days |
- 25-day VaR = 2,000,000 × √25 = 10,000,000
Risk grows with the square root of time, provided the days are independent.
2 uncorrelated desks
| Desk A VaR | 6 |
|---|---|
| Desk B VaR | 8 |
| Correlation | 0 |
- Sum of squares = 62 + 82 = 100
- Combined VaR = √100 = 10
Together the desks need 10, not the 14 of adding them up.
It scales with √days for independent days. Historical simulation replays past moves on today's positions. VaRs of desks with uncorrelated P&L (profit and loss) combine like volatilities, so a hedge can lower the total.
Scaling linearly assumes every day's loss adds up perfectly. At 99% over 500 days, about 5 days lie beyond the VaR, so it is roughly the 5th worst loss; conventions differ slightly.
Adding VaRs is the case of perfect correlation; uncorrelated books combine as the square root of the sum of squares. A new trade with its own VaR can still reduce the desk's VaR if it offsets existing risk.
Losses beyond the threshold can be much larger, which is the point of expected shortfall.
- Scaling VaR linearly with time.
- Adding the VaRs of uncorrelated desks.
- Calling VaR the worst loss possible.
How would you compute a historical VaR?
What does a 1-day 99% VaR of 10 million mean, and what does it not tell you?
Explain VaR to a board member who has never heard of it, and tell them what it does not say.
A complete answer covers
- It is a loss we expect to exceed only rarely, say 1 day in 100.
- It comes from past market moves applied to today's positions.
- It does not say how bad losses are beyond that level.
- So we also run stress tests and look at expected shortfall.
Also in our technical interviews, on camera, with a score.
Concept 2 of 71 min
Where VaR fails: tails, liquidity, options and backtesting
Backtesting a 99% VaR
| VaR level | 99% |
|---|---|
| Tail | 1% |
| Days observed | 250 |
| Exceptions seen | 7 |
| Amber zone | 5 to 9 |
| Red zone from | 10 |
- Exceptions expected = 250 × 0.01 = 2.5
- 7 sits between 5 and 9: the amber zone
Almost 3 times the expected exceptions: amber, short of the red zone.
Short options, out-of-the-money ones included, need full revaluation and gamma limits. Backtesting counts exceptions: at 99% over 250 days, 10 or more is Basel's red zone.
Large moves happen far more often than the normal predicts. Selling a big block of an illiquid bond takes time and moves the price.
A desk that is flat delta but short gamma loses on large moves in either direction, which a delta limit does not see.
About 2.5 exceptions are expected in 250 days at 99%; Basel's traffic lights run green up to 4, amber from 5 to 9 and red from 10.
- Trusting a normal VaR on fat-tailed returns.
- Valuing an illiquid position as if it could be sold at once.
- Limiting an options desk on delta alone.
Your VaR model had 9 exceptions this year at 99%. What do you do?
A complete answer covers
- Recognise it is well above the 2 or 3 expected: the model understates risk.
- Check the exceptions: fat tails, missing risk factors, stale data, option effects.
- Fix the model or add capital and tighten limits meanwhile.
- Report it to model validation and the regulator as required.
Also in our technical interviews, on camera, with a score.
Sources: Basel Framework, MAR32.9
Concept 3 of 71 min
Expected shortfall, stressed VaR and stress tests
VaR and expected shortfall (ES)
| Daily losses observed | 500 |
|---|---|
| Confidence | 99% |
| Tail | 1% |
| Worst loss | 12 |
| 2nd worst | 9 |
| 3rd worst | 8 |
| 4th worst | 7 |
| 5th worst | 6 |
- Days in the tail = 500 × 0.01 = 5
- 99% VaR: about 6, the 5th worst
- ES = (12 + 9 + 8 + 7 + 6) ÷ 5 = 8.4
VaR says where the tail starts, 6; expected shortfall says how deep it goes, 8.4.
Basel's liquidity horizons run from 10 to 120 days.
Stressed VaR is calibrated on a past crisis, stress tests price extreme scenarios, and a reverse stress test starts from the loss that would break the firm. VaR says where the tail starts; expected shortfall says how bad it is on average, which is why the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book moved to it.
A 10-day horizon is too short for exotic or illiquid positions. Stressed VaR was added after 2008 so capital does not fall when recent markets are calm.
Stress tests go beyond the data, such as a crash or a rate shock; a reverse stress test exposes hidden vulnerabilities by asking what would sink the firm.
- Saying expected shortfall is smaller than VaR.
- Thinking stress tests replace VaR or limits.
- Starting a reverse stress test from a historical scenario.
Two portfolios have the same VaR. Why might one be far riskier?
Why did regulators move from VaR to expected shortfall for market risk?
Why did regulators move trading book capital from VaR to expected shortfall?
A complete answer covers
- VaR ignores how large losses are beyond the threshold.
- Expected shortfall averages the tail, so fat tails raise capital.
- At 97.5% it is close to a 99% VaR in calm, normal markets.
- It came with longer liquidity horizons for illiquid risks.
Also in our technical interviews, on camera, with a score.
Sources: Basel Framework, MAR33.3
Concept 4 of 71 min
Counterparty risk: exposure, netting, CVA and wrong-way risk
Exposure to one client, in millions
| Value today | +8 |
|---|---|
| Add-on (future exposure) | 3 |
| Collateral | 6 |
- Exposure = 8 + 3 − 6 = 5
The bank could lose up to about 5 million if the client defaults.
Netting with one counterparty
| Trade 1 | +7 |
|---|---|
| Trade 2 | −4 |
| Trade 3 | +2 |
- Netted = 7 − 4 + 2 = 5
Netting cuts the exposure to 5, instead of the 9 owed on the positive trades alone.
The CVA, in millions
| Expected exposure | 10 |
|---|---|
| Default probability | 2% |
| Loss given default | 60% |
- CVA ≈ 10 × 0.02 × 0.6 = 0.12
The trade is worth about 120,000 less because the client may default.
CVA lowers value by the expected cost of default, about expected exposure × PD (probability of default) × LGD (loss given default), so an uncollateralised BB-rated client costs more than a AAA bank. Wrong-way risk grows as the counterparty weakens.
A derivative worth +5 today can be worth much more tomorrow, so exposure adds what it could become. Without netting, the bank would be exposed to its positive trades and still owe on its negative ones.
An uncollateralised swap with a weak name carries a larger CVA from day one than the same swap with a strong, fully collateralised bank. Protection on a bank bought from a closely tied bank is worth least exactly when it is needed.
- Leaving the potential future exposure out.
- Adding gross positive values when trades are netted.
- Buying protection from a seller tied to the reference name.
A corporate client wants a large uncollateralised interest rate swap. What would you consider before agreeing?
A complete answer covers
- The exposure today and its potential growth over the life of the swap.
- The client's credit quality and the CVA to charge.
- Netting with other trades, collateral or break clauses to reduce exposure.
- Any wrong-way risk between the swap and the client's health.
Also in our technical interviews, on camera, with a score.
Concept 5 of 71 min
Expected loss, capital and concentration
Expected loss on a loan, in millions
| Loan | 50 |
|---|---|
| Probability of default | 2% |
| Loss given default | 40% |
- Loss if it defaults = 50 × 40% = 20
- Recovered = 50 − 20 = 30
- Expected loss = 0.02 × 20 = 0.4 a year
The 400,000 a year goes into the loan's margin; capital is there for the losses beyond it.
Expected losses are a cost of doing business; capital is for the bad years. One downturn hits many loans in the same industry together, so sector and single-name limits control it.
Day-to-day costs and dividends are not what capital is for.
Pricing and provisions cover the losses a bank expects on average, while capital covers the unexpected ones at a high confidence level, which is why it is sized on a bad year rather than a normal one.
- Saying capital covers expected losses.
- Multiplying exposure by the probability of default alone.
- Ignoring correlation within an industry.
Why do lenders hold capital if expected losses are already covered by provisions?
How do you compute the expected loss on a loan, and what is it used for?
A loan officer argues that a sector is safe because each borrower has a low default probability. What is missing from that view?
A complete answer covers
- Defaults in one sector tend to happen together.
- Concentration raises unexpected losses, which capital must cover.
- Look at the share of the book and at stress scenarios for the sector.
- Set limits by sector and by name.
Also in our technical interviews, on camera, with a score.
Concept 6 of 71 min
Operational, model, basis and banking-book risks
Hedging with index futures
| Portfolio | €80 million |
|---|---|
| Beta | 0.9 |
| Future size | €0.2 million |
- Futures = 80 × 0.9 ÷ 0.2 = 360
Selling 360 futures of €200,000 each removes the market risk; buying them would double it.
A government bond future hedging a corporate bond leaves basis risk. Banking-book rate risk is measured on EVE (economic value of equity) and NII (net interest income).
An equity hedge sells value × beta ÷ contract notional in futures. Markets caused the losses in a rogue trading case, but the failure was in controls.
Mis-specified models, bad data or use outside their limits misprice or mis-hedge; independent validation addresses it.
A rate hedge leaves the bond's credit spread unhedged. EVE looks at the present value of all cash flows, NII at earnings over the next year or two, and a shock can hit one and not the other.
Ignoring beta leaves part of the market risk; buying futures would double it.
- Calling rogue trading market risk.
- Thinking a government bond future hedges a corporate bond fully.
- Ignoring beta when sizing an index hedge.
A pricing model has been used for years without problems. Why would you still have it reviewed?
A complete answer covers
- Markets change and assumptions can stop holding.
- It may now be used for products it was not built for.
- Data feeding it may have changed or degraded.
- Independent validation and limits on use are what control model risk.
Also in our technical interviews, on camera, with a score.
Concept 7 of 71 min
AdvancedWhen VaR punishes diversification
VaR punishes the pair
| Bonds | 2 |
|---|---|
| Defaults | independent |
| Loss on default | 100 each |
| Default chance | 4% each |
| Survival chance | 96% each |
| VaR confidence | 95% |
- Alone: 4% is below 5%, so the VaR is 0
- At least one default = 1 − 0.962 = 7.84%
- Together: 7.84% is above 5%, so the VaR is 100
The pair's VaR of 100 is more than the sum of the parts, 0 and 0.
Expected shortfall does not
| Tail averaged | worst 5% |
|---|---|
| 1 bond alone | 4% at 100 |
| Both default | 0.16% at 200 |
| One defaults | 4.84% at 100 |
- One bond = 4 × 100 ÷ 5 = 80
- Pair's tail = 0.16 × 200 + 4.84 × 100 = 516
- The pair = 516 ÷ 5 = 103.2
The pair's 103.2 stays below the 160 of the 2 bonds apart: diversification is rewarded.
- 95% VaR
- 95% expected shortfall
Take 2 independent bonds, each with a chance of default smaller than the 5% tail of a 95% VaR. Alone, each bond's VaR is 0, because its default sits outside the worst 5% of outcomes.
Together, the chance that at least one defaults rises above 5%, so the portfolio's VaR jumps to a full loss: more than the sum of the parts.
Expected shortfall averages the worst 5% of outcomes, so it sees each bond's default even alone, and together the tail mixes double and single defaults, which keeps it below the sum of the parts. VaR ignores what happens beyond its threshold; expected shortfall looks there and rewards diversification.
That is one reason regulators moved to expected shortfall, and why tail risk in credit portfolios is measured with it.
- Assuming VaR always falls when risks are diversified.
- Reading a VaR of 0 as no risk when the loss sits just beyond the threshold.
- Adding expected shortfalls and calling it the portfolio's: that is only an upper bound.
Two independent loans each have a 95% VaR of zero. Can their portfolio have a positive VaR?
A complete answer covers
- Yes: each default chance can sit below 5% while the chance of at least one sits above.
- VaR then rises with diversification, so it is not subadditive.
- Expected shortfall averages the tail and never exceeds the sum of the parts.
- That is one reason the trading-book rules moved to expected shortfall.
Also in our technical interviews, on camera, with a score.
Recap
- Normal VaR = z × σ × value (1.65 at 95%, 2.33 at 99%); scale by √days; VaRs combine like volatilities, not by addition.
- VaR is a threshold, not a worst case; it misses fat tails, illiquidity and the gamma of options.
- Expected shortfall averages the tail; Basel uses it at 97.5% with liquidity horizons of 10 to 120 days.
- Counterparty exposure = positive value + potential future exposure − collateral, after netting; CVA prices the default risk.
- Expected loss = PD × LGD × EAD, covered by pricing and provisions; capital covers the unexpected.
25 questions on Market and credit risk
Timed, like the real one, drawn from a bank of 36. Every answer explained.